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Abstract
In 1981, Paris and Wilkie [21] indicated it was an open question whether IΣ0 would satisfy the Second
Incompleteness Theorem for Herbrand deduction. We will show that IΣ0 will both obey and defy the
Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, depending on which of several equivalent
deﬁnitions of IΣ0 one examines.
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1 Introduction
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem [9] asserts that neither Peano Arith-
metic, nor any consistent extension of it, can prove a theorem aﬃrming its
own self-consistency under Hilbert deduction. There have been numerous gen-
eralizations and extensions of Go¨del’s seminal result [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,12,15,18,19]
[21,22,23,24,25,26,28,27,29,30,33,35,37,39]. For example, the combined work of
Pudla´k and Solovay [23,26] has shown that essentially no axiom system that recog-
nizes Successor(x) = x + 1 as a total function can prove a theorem aﬃrming its
own consistency under Hilbert deduction.
In 1981, Paris and Wilkie [21] noticed that it was an open question whether
the axiom system IΣ0 did satisfy the Second Incompleteness Theorem for cut-free
methods of deduction. Interestingly, Paris-Wilkie observed that IΣ0+Exp is unable
to prove the Hilbert consistency of even an axiom system as simple as Q [31].
Subsequently. Adamowicz-Zbierski [1,3] showed that IΣ0+Ω1 was unable to verify
its Herbrand and semantic tableaux consistency, and Willard [33,35] expanded this
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result to show that the cut-free versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
applied also to the standard textbook versions [10,13,17] of IΣ0’s axiomatization.
On 16 November 2005, we received a fascinating email communication from L.A.
Kolodziejczyk about this subject. It observed that there are two natural formalisms
for axiomatizing IΣ0, henceforth called Ax-1 and Ax-2. Both shall take the Tarski-
Mostowski-Robinson axiom system Q as their starting base. In a context where
φ(x, y) is a Δ0 formula, these formalisms will use respectively Equations (1) and
(2) to denote their induction schemes.
∀x { { φ(x, 0) ∧ ∀y [ φ(x, y) =⇒ φ(x, y′) ] } =⇒ ∀y φ(x, y) }(1)
∀x∀z { { φ(x, 0) ∧ ∀y ≤ z [φ(x, y) =⇒ φ(x, y′) ] } =⇒ ∀y ≤ z φ(x, y) }(2)
Kolodziejczyk noticed that logically equivalent axiom systems, such as Ax-1 and Ax-
2, do not necessarily have the same properties with regards to the cut-free versions
of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. He thus asked whether [35]’s semantic
tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will generalize for Ax-2’s
unconventional induction scheme?
One half of our 2-part answer to this question appears in a separate paper [40].
It explains how our prior results about Ax-1’s cut-free incompleteness properties
have direct generalizations for Ax-2. The second half of our 2-part answer will
appear in this conference paper. It is as follows:
Suppose one wishes to play the very adversarial role of being the Devil’s Advo-
cate who seeks to ﬁnd other axiomatizations of IΣ0, that prove the same theorems
as Ax-1 and Ax-2. Then it turns out one can construct a third unorthodox axiom-
atization of IΣ0, called Ax-3, which evades the Herbrandized version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem.
In order to understand the nature of this quite counter-intuitive eﬀect, it is useful
to recall that α ∼= β denotes merely that the two axiom systems α and β formally
prove the same set of theorems. The central point is that such an equivalence does
not imply that these two systems can physically prove the statement that “ α ∼= β ”.
For this reason, one certainly cannot automatically presume that β satisﬁes a ﬁxed
version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, when a logically equivalent axiom
system α does. Thus, this paper will formalize a third equivalent axiomatization
for IΣ0 that manages to evade at least the Herbrandized version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem.
2 The Deﬁnition of a New Version of IΣ0
A formula will be called ΔR0 iﬀ it has a structure similar to a Δ0 formula except
that its bounded quantiﬁers, “ ∀ v ≤ T ” and “ ∃ v ≤ T, ”, are now disallowed
from using the conventional arithmetic functions of addition and multiplication
in their terms T . Instead, the terms of a ΔR0 formula will employ only the
maximum function as the only permissible operator to deﬁne a variable’s bounded
range. (Arithmetic functions are allowed to appear elsewhere in the body of a ΔR0
formula.) Thus, Equation (3) is an example of a ΔR0 formula, and (4) is an example
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of a Δ0 formula that is not Δ
R
0 .
∀ p ≤ Max(x, y) [ ( p + y ≤ x + 2 ∗ y) ∨ ( p ∗ y ≤ y ∗ y ∗ y ) ](3)
∀ p ≤ x ∗ y [ ( p + y ≤ x + 2 ∗ y) ∨ ( p ∗ y ≤ y ∗ y ∗ x ) ](4)
Let us call a formula ΠR1 iﬀ it can be written as ∀ v1 ∀ v2 ... ∀ vn φ(v1, v2, ...vn)
where φ(v1, v2, ...vn) is a Δ
R
0 formula. Each of Ax-1, Ax-2 and Ax-3 will contain a
common set of nine ΠR1 axioms, called Q0 and listed below. The main purpose of
Q0 will be to deﬁne the constructs of addition, multiplication, integer-successor,
maximum and also = and ≤.
1 = 0′ ∧ 2 = 1′ ∧ 0 = 0 ∧ 0′ 
= 0 ∧ 0 ≤ 0 ∧ ¬ [ 0′ ≤ 0 ](5)
∀ x ( x + 0 = x ∧ x · 0 = 0 ∧ x · 1 = x )(6)
∀x ∀y ( x′ = y′ ⇐⇒ x = y )(7)
∀x ∀y ( x ≤ y ⇐⇒ ( x′ ≤ y ∨ x = y )(8)
∀x ∀y x · y′ = (x · y) + x ∧ x + y′ = (x + y)′(9)
∀x ∀y ∀z [ x = y ∧ y = z ] ⇒ [ x = z ∧ z = x ](10)
∀x ∀y ∀z [ x = y ∧ y ≤ z ] ⇒ x ≤ z(11)
∀x ∀y ∀z [ x = y ∧ z ≤ y ] ⇒ z ≤ x(12)
∀x∀y ( x ≤ y ⇒ Max(x, y) = y ) ∧ ( y ≤ x ⇒ Max(x, y) = x )(13)
In the context of the above deﬁnition for Q0, the Ax-1 and Ax-2 axiomatizations for
IΣ0 will be deﬁned formally as the union of Q0 with all instances of respectively
Equations (1) and (2)’s induction schemas where φ(x, y) is a Δ0 formula. Similarly,
IndR will be deﬁned as the union of Q0 with all instances of Equation (2)’s induction
schemas where φ(x, y) is ΔR0 .
This paragraph will deﬁne a set of ΠR1 sentences, called Trivial-R, that has
the property that IndR +Trivial-R proves the same set of theorems as the more
conventional Ax-1 and Ax-2 axiomatization for IΣ0. In our discussion, a tuple
(a0, a1, a2, ...aN ) is called a Split Representation of an non-negative integer x
when the following condition is satisﬁed:
x =
N∑
i=1
ai ∗ (a0 + 1)
i−1 AND a1 ≤ a0 ∧ a2 ≤ a0 ∧ ... aN ≤ a0(14)
For a ﬁxed integer N , let SplitN (x , a0 , a1 , ... aN ) denote a Δ
R
0 formula indicating
(14) is satisﬁed.
For each of the arithmetic operators of + , ∗ , Max, = and ≤, the ax-
iom system Trivial-R will have available a family of ΔR0 predicates and Π
R
1
axioms for simulating the operations of these functions when they manipu-
late Split Representations of integers. Thus for a ﬁxed triple (I, J,K), let
MultI,J,K(a0, a1....aI , b0, b1....bJ , c0, c1....cK) designate a Δ
R
0 predicate simulating
the action of integer multiplication when its input is the two split integers of
(a0, a1....aI) and (b0, b1....bJ ) and its resultant is the multiplicative product of
(c0, c1....cK). The accompanying Π
R
1 axiom of our system Trivial-R, that indicates
this predicate operates correctly, will then be:
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∀ x ∀ y ∀ z ∀ a0 ∀ a1 ... ∀ aI ∀ b0 ∀ b1 ... ∀ bJ ∀ c0 ∀ c1 ... ∀ cK
{ [ SplitI(x, a0...aI) ∧ Split
J(y, b0...bJ) ∧ Split
K(z, c0...cK) ] =⇒
[ x ∗ y = z ⇐⇒ MultI,J,K(a0...aI , b0...bJ , c0...cK) ] }
Likewise, Trivial-R will have available the suitable Π1 analogs of the above axiom
simulating similarly the formalisms of addition, maximum, equality, and less-than-
or equals among split integers.
Henceforth, Ax-3 will denote the axiom system IndR +Trivial-R. Section 3 will
prove that Ax-3 proves the same set of theorems as Ax-1 and Ax-2.
Deﬁnition 1 Let α ⊇ β denote that α’s set of formal axioms includes all β ’s
axioms. (This deﬁnition of “⊇ ”, is stronger than the more modest construct that
α proves all β ’s theorems.) Also assuming α denotes a consistent axiom sys-
tem and D denotes a deductive method, (α,D) will be called a Threshold for
the Second Incompleteness Eﬀect iﬀ all consistent extensions α∗ ⊇ α have the
property that α∗ is unable to prove the consistency of its proofs using deduction
method D. Otherwise, (α,D) will be called an Anti-Threshold. (It means that
some consistent α∗ ⊇ α can prove a theorem aﬃrming its own consistency under
deduction method D.)
In this context, our main result will be that Ax-3 is an anti-threshold for the
Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This means that
there must assuredly exist some consistent system α∗ ⊇ Ax-3, where α∗ can prove
a theorem aﬃrming its own Herbrand consistency.
This result is surprising because Ax-1 and Ax-2 are at the same time Herbran-
dized thresholds. We again remind the reader that logically equivalent systems can
have opposite threshold properties. This is because α ∼= β denotes merely that the
two axiom systems α and β prove the same set of theorems. Under our notation,
it does not imply that either α or β can prove the statement “ α ∼= β ”. (This is
the intuitive explanation for why Ax-3’s threshold property will diverge from that
of Ax-1 and Ax-2.)
3 Basic Framework and Underlying Intuition
This section will formally prove that Ax-3 proves the same set of theorems as Ax-
1 and Ax-2. It will also intuitively explain why Ax-3’s threshold property (under
Deﬁnition 1) is diﬀerent from that of Ax-1 and Ax-2.
Theorem 3.1 Each of Ax-1, Ax-2 and Ax-3 prove the same set of theorems.
Proof. (Sketch) It is well known Ax-1 and Ax-2 prove the same set of theorems.
Thus to establish Theorem 3.1, we need only show Ax-2∼=Ax-3. Our proof will use
the fact that Paris and Dimitracopoulos [20] have observed that in model-theoretic
sense, there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between Δ0 formulae and their equivalent
representations in a ΔR0 form.
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In the interests of brevity, we will omit formally proving that Ax-2∼=Ax-3. In-
stead, our proof-sketch will explore an example illustrating the underlying intuition
behind this invariant.
Thus, let ψ(x, y) denote a ΔR0 formula. For any integer k, it is possible to
construct a ΔR0 formula ψ
∗(x, y0, y1, ...yk) that is the counterpart of ψ(x, y) for split
representations of integers by satisfying the following property:
∀ x ∀ y ∀ y0 ∀ y1 ... ∀ yk
{ Splitk(y, y0...yk) =⇒ [ ψ(x, y) ⇐⇒ ψ
∗(x, y0, y1, ...yk) ] }(15)
Let SizeL(y0, y1, ...jk) denote a Δ
R
0 formula indicating that (y0, y1, ...jk) represents
an integer ≤ L. Then Ax-3 can use its Trivial-R axioms to ﬁrst prove Equation
(15), and then to formally prove that the two Δ0 formulae of ∃y ≤ x
k ψ(x, y)
and ∀y ≤ xk ψ(x, y) are equivalent to the respective ΔR0 formulae of:
∃ y0 ≤ x ∃ y1 ≤ x ... ∃ yk ≤ x Sizexk(y0, y1, ...yk) ∧ ψ
∗(x, y0, y1, ...yk)
∀ y0 ≤ x ∀ y1 ≤ x ... ∀ yk ≤ x Sizexk(y0, y1, ...yk)⇒ ψ
∗(x, y0, y1, ...yk)
Thus by essentially applying n iterations of this technique (and its obvious analogs)
to any initial Δ0 formula with n bounded quantiﬁers, Ax-3 can transform an ar-
bitrary Δ0 formula into a provably equivalent Δ
R
0 formula. It thus follows that al-
though the Ax-3 system contains technically only instances of Equation (2)’s axiom
schema for ΔR0 formulae, it nevertheless has an ability to formally prove as theorems
all the remaining instances of this axiom schema for Δ0 formulae as well. 
Our proof that Ax-3 is an anti-threshold for the Herbrandized version of the
Incompleteness Theorem will appear in Section 4. Before starting that discussion,
the underlying intuition as to why Ax-2 and Ax-3 do operate so very diﬀerently
should be explained.
Let Υn denote the Δ0 sentence deﬁned by Equation (16). Note this sen-
tence is comprised of O( n ) logic symbols, and it asserts that the variables
v0 , v1 , v2 , ...vn , have the properties that vi = 2
2i .
∃ v0 ≤ 2 ∃ v1 ≤ v0 ∗ v0 ∃ v2 ≤ v1 ∗ v1 ... ∃ vn ≤ vn−1 ∗ vn−1
v0 = 2 ∧ v1 = v0 ∗ v0 ∧ v2 = v1 ∗ v1 ∧ ... ∧ vn = vn−1 ∗ vn−1(16)
It is easy to see there exists some ΔR0 sentence, called say Υ
R
n that is the counterpart
of Equation (16) written in a notation using split integers. This sentence will
indicate the existence of a sequence of split integers S0 , S1 , S2 , ...Sn , where
Si represents the quantity 2
2i .
However although they in some sense represent equivalent concepts, there is a
fundamental diﬀerence between the Δ0 sentence Υn and its Δ
R
0 counterpart Υ
R
n .
This diﬀerence is easiest to explain if one uses a logical language that has only 3
named constants, 0, 1 and 2, and if split integers are encoded as base 2 numbers.
Then ΥRn will be encoded as a sequence of at least 2
n characters, but Υn’s
length has a sharply diﬀerent O(n) magnitude. As a consequence of this distinction
(and its generalizations), we can establish that although Ax-2 and Ax-3 prove the
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identical set of formal theorems, their proofs of many theorems can diﬀer by an
exponential magnitude in length
This fact is crucial for understanding why these two formalisms have diﬀerent
incompleteness-threshold properties. It explains intuitively why Ax-2 (in our com-
panion paper [40]) obeys the Second Incompleteness Theorem, but Ax-3 is shown
(in the next section) to actually evade it.
4 Main Analysis
A sentence ψ in the propositional calculus will be called an Anti-Tautology iﬀ ψ is
unsatisﬁable (i.e. ¬ψ is a tautology). Our deﬁnition of Herbrand deduction will be
identical to the deﬁnitions used by Adamowicz, Ha´jek-Pudla´k and Kolodziejczyk,
[1,10,15], except that we will use a dual version of this deﬁnition that follows from
De Morgan’s Rule, where disjunctions are replaced with conjunctions and where
tautologies are replaced with anti-tautologies. In other words, our deﬁnition will
use the well-known identity that
n∨
i=1
¬φi = ¬
n∧
i=1
φi(17)
Our deﬁnition of Herbrand deduction will diﬀer from its more conventional deﬁ-
nitions by using the right (instead of left) side of (17)’s identity. This change in
notation is unnecessary, but it does help simplify our proofs.
Let Ψ denote an arbitrary prenex normal sentence such as the prototype below,
whose open subcomponent is denoted as ψ˜ .
∀ x1 ∃ y1 ∀ x2 ∃ y2 .... ∀ xn ∃ yn ψ˜ (x1, y1...xn, yn)(18)
In a context where fψ1 (x1), f
ψ
2 (x1, x2) ... f
ψ
n (x1, x2, ...xn) are new function symbols,
Equation (19) is called the Skolemization of Equation (18).
∀x1 ∀x2 .... ∀xn ψ˜ [ x1 , f
ψ
1 (x1) , x2 , f
ψ
2 (x1, x2) ... xn , f
ψ
n (x1, x2...xn) ](19)
In a context where L is a logical language and α is an axiom system, we will
let CL and FL denote the set of constant and function symbols associated with
L . Similarly, Fα will denote the set of “Skolemized” function symbols associated
with α’s axioms. Thus using (18) and (19)’s notation, let α denote a system of
axioms Ψ1 , Ψ2 , Ψ3 ... , and for an arbitrary index i let its Skolemized function
symbols carry names such as fψ1i , f
ψ2
i , f
ψ3
i , ... The Herbrandized Terms for
this ordered pair (α,L) will then be deﬁned to be the set of all terms generated by
the constants from the set CL combined with the functional operations from the
set Fα ∪ FL.
A Herbrandized Instance of a Skolemized axiom is a sentence identical to
this axiom except that all its universally quantiﬁed variables are replaced by Her-
brandized terms. For instance in a context where T1, T2, T3... are Herbrandized
terms, Equation (20) is such an instance of (19)’s axiom:
ψ˜ [ T1 , f
ψ
1 (T1) , T2 , f
ψ
2 (T1, T2) ... Tn , f
ψ
n (T1, T2...Tn) ](20)
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Let ⊥ denote the logical constant of FALSE. A Herbrandized Proof of ⊥ from
the axiom system α is deﬁned as a ﬁnite collection of Herbrandized instances of
α together with a proof, in the pure propositional calculus, that the conjunction of
these instances is an anti-tautology.
Deﬁnition 2 Using our revised notation convention, the theorem Υ will be said
to have a Herbrandized Proof from the axiom system β if and only if the union
of the axiom system β with the added sentence ¬Υ produces a Herbrandized
proof of ⊥ .
More Notation: Let us say that a function G(x1 , x2, ... xn ) is a Non-Growth
Function iﬀ G(x1 , x2, ... xn ) ≤ Max(x1 , x2, ... xn ). Deﬁne a set S of functions
to be an Arithmetic Controlled Set iﬀ S includes the arithmetic functions of
addition, multiplication and successor and all its other functions are non-growth
functions. Also, deﬁne a term t to be an Arithmetically Controlled Term
iﬀ t is a term that uses only the symbols of 0, 1 and 2 as its inputted constants
and all its function symbols come from some Arithmetic Controlled Set S . Thus
if G1 and G2 are non-growth functions, Equation (21) represents an arithmetically
controlled term.
G1[ (1 + 1) ∗ (1 + 1) , 1 + 0 ] ∗ G2( 1 + 1 + 0 , 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 )(21)
Also, in a context where Ct and Ft denote the number of constant and function
symbols in t, we will use the following notation:
(i) MinG(t) will denote the quantity 2Ct+Ft .
(ii) Val(t) will denote the quantity represented by the term t.
For example if G1(x, y) = |x − y| and G2(x, y) = Min(x, y) then Equation
(21)’s term t will have V al(t) = 3 ∗ 4 = 12 and MinG(t) = 225 (because t
contains 12 function symbols and 13 constant symbols).
Lemma 4.1 Let t be an arithmetically controlled term which satisﬁes the inequal-
ity Val(t) ≥ 4. Then Val(t) < MinG(t)
Proof Sketch: Suppose for some k ≥ 2, that Val(t) = 2k. Then it easy to see
that t ’s maximally compressed representation as an arithmetically controlled term
is “ 2∗2∗ .... 2 ”. Thus MinG(t) = 22k−1 >Val(t) = 2k is valid in this case because
the preceding product has k appearances of the constant 2 connected by k − 1
appearances of the multiplication symbol. Moreover, it is easily proven that terms,
which are not powers of 2, are never represented in a more compressed form than
the greatest power of 2 that they exceed. Thus Lemma 4.1 is valid for all terms
where Val(t) ≥ 4. 
Deﬁnition 3 For a ﬁxed constant B > 0, a set S of functions is deﬁned to be a
B−Bounded Arithmetic Set iﬀ S includes the arithmetic functions of addition,
multiplication and successor and all its other functions G satisfy the constraint
that
G(x1, x2, ...xn) ≤ Max(x1, x2, ...xn) when Max(x1, x2, ...xn) < B(22)
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Also, we will say a term t is a B-Bounded Arithmetic Term iﬀ t is a term
that uses only the symbols of 0, 1 and 2 as its inputted constants and all its function
symbols come from some B-Bounded Arithmetic Set S .
Lemma 4.2. provides the generalization of Lemma 4.1 for B-bounded arithmetic
terms. Its proof is omitted because it is similar to Lemma 4.1’s proof.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose that t is a B−bounded arithmetic term with MinG(t) < B
and Val(t) ≥ 4. Then Val(t) < MinG(t)
Deﬁnition 4 Let Φ denote the ΠR1 sentence below whose Δ
R
0 subformula is deﬁned
by φ˜ ( a1, a2 ... an ).
∀a1∀a2...∀an φ˜ (a1, a2...an)(23)
For any B ≥ 1, Equation (23) is called a B−Bounded Valid ΠR1 sentence iﬀ
(24) is valid under the standard model of the natural numbers:
∀ a1 < B ∀ a2 < B ... ∀ an < B φ˜ ( a1, a2 ... an )(24)
Deﬁnition 5 An axiom system α will be said to satisfy the Canonical Arith-
metic Condition when all α’s axioms are ΠR1 sentences and they include Q0’s nine
axioms (i.e. Equations (5)–(13) ).
Deﬁnition 6 Let Θ denote a methodology for assigning Go¨del numbers to Her-
brand proofs (which are henceforth denoted as P ). Let us recall that MinG(t) was
deﬁned by Item (i) in this section. Deﬁne Θ to be a Conventional Encoding
Method if Θ(P ) > MinG(t) whenever the proof P contains the Herbrand
term t . (Such encodings are called “conventional” because all usual methods for
encoding Herbrand proofs satisfy Θ(P ) > MinG(t) .)
Theorem 4.3 Suppose α is a canonical arithmetic axiom system consisting of
B−Bounded Valid ΠR1 sentences and Θ again satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6’s Conventional
Encoding property. Then any Herbrand proof P of ⊥ from the axiom system α
will satisfy the inequality that Θ(P ) > B .
General Comments about Theorem 4.3 and its Proof: At an intuitive
level, Theorem 4.3 can be viewed as a consequence of the machineries of Lemma 4.2
and Deﬁnitions 4–6. This is because the B-Bounded validity condition in Theorem
4.3’s hypothesis can be used to show that a Herbrand proof P of ⊥ must contain
some term t where Val(t) ≥ B . In this context, the combination of Lemma 4.2
and Deﬁnition 6 will imply that such a term will force P ’s Go¨del number to exceed
the lower bound of B.
A formal proof of Theorem 4.3 is available in the Appendix. Our recommen-
dation is that if a reader does wish to examine this appendix’s proof, he do so
only after he ﬁnishes the next two pages of this article. They will explain how the
formalism of Theorem 4.3 shall enable us to prove the surprising result that the
Ax-3 axiomatization for IΣ0 is an anti-threshold for the Herbrandized version of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem.
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Theorem 4.4 For any arbitrary axiom system α and deduction method D, let
Diagonal(α,D) denote the following sentence:
Diagonal(α,D) = There is no proof (using deduction method D ) of the
“falsity sentence” ⊥ from the union of the axiom system α with this sentence
“Diagonal(α,D) ” (looking at itself).
Also, in a context where i = 1, 2 or 3, let Diag(i) denote the special variant of
Diagonal(α,D) where α = Ax−i and D designates Herbrand deduction. Both
these constructs are well deﬁned, and Diag(i) also has a ΠR1 encoding.
Sketch of Theorem 4.4’s proof and comment about its signiﬁcance. As
early as 1938, Kleene observed [14] that a form of the sentence Diagonal(α,D)
was well deﬁned. More recently, Willard [34,37] observed this sentence also has a
Π1 encoding in the conventional language of arithmetic. It is straightforward to
generalize [34,37]’s result to establish that Diag(i) has a well deﬁned ΠR1 encoding
(thus completing Theorem 4.4’s proof.) 
Clarifying Comment: One should be somewhat cautious in interpreting the
meaning of Theorem 4.4. It does not indicate that Diag(i) is a logically valid
statement under the standard model of the natural numbers. Rather, it merely
indicates Diag(i) is a well deﬁned ΠR1 sentence. In fact, Diag(1) and Diag(2) can be
proven to be logically invalid statements (see footnote 1 ). In contrast, Theorem
4.5 (below) will prove Diag(3) is logically valid.
Theorem 4.5 Let Ax-3* denote the union of Ax-3 with the sentence Diag(3). Then
Ax-3* is consistent. (Hence it follows that Ax-3 is an “anti-threshold” for the Her-
brandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem under Deﬁnition 1’s no-
tation convention.)
Proof of the Consistency Property of Ax-3*: Suppose for the sake of
establishing a proof-by-contradiction that Ax-3* was inconsistent. Then one could
identify a proof P of ⊥ whose Go¨del number Θ(P ) is the smallest Go¨del number
of a Herbrand proof of ⊥ from Ax-3*. We will now construct from P an alternate
Herbrand proof R of ⊥ where Θ(R) < Θ(P ). The formal construction of such
a R will suﬃce for our proof by contradiction to reach its desired end because such
a R cannot possibly exist (on account of P ’s minimality property).
Our strategy is to use Theorem 4.3 to construct R from P . Theorem 4.3
is relevant to Ax-3* (but not also to Ax-1’s or Ax-2’s analogs of it ) because only
all the formal axioms of Ax-3* are assuredly ΠR1 sentences. This distinction arises
because the induction schemes for Ax-3 (and thus Ax-3*) uses ΔR0 formulae (unlike
the more liberal Ax-1 and Ax-2 induction schemes that replace ΔR0 formulae with
1 For an arbitrary axiom system α, let αD denote the union of α with the added sentence Diagonal(α, D).
Most such systems αD are known to be inconsistent because they would otherwise violate Go¨del’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem. The main point of our prior research [32,34,37,39] is that the usual paradigm
where an essentially classic Go¨del-like diagonalization argument will render αD inconsistent applies to
most, but not all systems αD . Thus, it turns out that the classic Go¨del-like paradigm applies to Ax-1 and
Ax-2 under Herbrand deduction. On the other hand, the ﬁnal result of this paper (Theorem 4.5) will prove
that Ax-3 is quite diﬀerent.
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the less manageable Δ0 expressions)
On account of the fact that all Ax-3* ’s axioms are ΠR1 sentences, we may
apply Theorem 4.3 to conclude that for some B < Θ(P ), at least one of the
axiom sentences of Ax-3* fail to be a B-Bounded valid ΠR1 sentence. Moreover, it
is obvious that all the axioms of Ax-3 possess an unbounded level of validity (i.e
they are B−Bounded valid for all possible B.) Hence, these two observations imply
Diag(3) fails to be B−bounded valid (simply because some axiom from Ax-3* must
fail to be B−bounded valid, and Diag(3) is the only axiom belonging to Ax-3* that
is not also a member of Ax-3.)
The latter observation, combined with Diag(3)’s deﬁnition, implies that some R
with Θ(R) < B must be another proof of ⊥. (This is because Diag(3)’s failure to
be B−bounded valid implies such an R must assuredly exist.) Hence Θ(R) < B <
Θ(P ) and our proof-by-contradiction is ﬁnished because P ’s previously presumed
minimality has been contradicted by R. 
5 Concluding Remarks
The research reported here is essentially the third facet of a 3-part project. The
ﬁrst facet was our year-2002 JSL article [35]. It established that the main textbook
axiomatization of IΣ0 [10,13,17], which we have called Ax-1, satisﬁes the semantic
tableaux and Herbrandized versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. The
second part of this project [40] had generalized the preceding incompleteness re-
sult so that it also applied to Ax-2. This current article has shown that Ax-3,
quite surprisingly, evades the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem.
One reason our results are of interest is because there have been no prior exam-
ples in the literature where a natural axiom system, such as IΣ0, can have several
equivalent axiomatizations, some of which satisfy the Herbrandized form of the Sec-
ond Incompleteness Theorem and others of which represent what Deﬁnition 1 calls
its “anti-thresholds”. (As we noted earlier, it is possible for two logically equivalent
axiom systems, α and β, to have opposite threshold-incompleteness properties
because the fact that α ∼= β does not imply that either of these two systems can
formally prove “ α ∼= β ”. )
The many generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem are clearly
signiﬁcantly more important than its occasional boundary-case exceptions. Never-
theless, these partial exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem should not
be ignored. Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem is usually regarded as the paramount
discovery of 20th century mathematics. It thus beckons the academic community
to explore its possible boundary case exceptions, so that an understanding of its
full meaning can be sharpened and made more precise. Within such a limited-but-
precise framework, the anomalous behavior of Ax-3, documented in this article,
should be of scholarly interest.
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6 Appendix: The Proof For Theorem 4.3
Our proof of Theorem 4.3 will essentially be an easy consequence of the machineries
of Deﬁnition 7 and of two further lemmas.
Deﬁnition 7 Consider the possibility that Ψ is the prenex normal sentence, whose
open part is formalized by ψ˜ (, x1, y1...xn, yn), shown in Equation (25) and whose
Skolemized normalized form is illustrated by Equation (26).
∀ x1 ∃ y1 ∀ x2 ∃ y2 .... ∀ xn ∃ yn ψ˜ (, x1, y1...xn, yn)(25)
∀x1 ∀x2 .... ∀xn ψ˜ [x1 , f
ψ
1 (x1) , x2 , f
ψ
2 (x1, x2) ... xn , f
ψ
n (x1, x2...xn) ](26)
For any B ≥ 1, Equations (25) and (26) will be called a B−Bounded Good
Skolemization iﬀ one can deﬁne (26)’s Skolem functions fΨ1 , f
Ψ
2 ... f
Ψ
n so that
they simultaneously satisfy Deﬁnition 3’s B−Bounded requirement and Equation
(27) under the standard model of the natural numbers.
∀ x1 < B ∀ x2 < B .... ∀ xn < B
ψ˜ [ x1 , f
ψ
1 (x1) , x2 , f
ψ
2 (x1, x2) ... xn , f
ψ
n (x1, x2...xn) ](27)
Likewise, we will say an axiom system α has a B−Bounded Good Skolemiza-
tion iﬀ all its axioms are so Skolemized.
Lemma 6.1 Using the notation conventions from Deﬁnitions 4 and 7, every
B−Bounded Valid ΠR1 sentence can be rewritten into a logically equivalent form
that has a B−Bounded Good Skolemization.
Proof. Follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of Bounded Validity and
Bounded Good Skolemizations (i.e. see Deﬁnitions 4 and 7). 
Lemma 6.2 Using the notation conventions from Deﬁnitions 5–7, suppose that
α is a canonical arithmetic system consisting of prenex sentences which possess
B−Bounded Good Skolemizations and that Θ satisﬁes the Conventional Encoding
property. Then any Herbrand proof P of ⊥ from the axiom system α will satisfy
Θ(P ) > B .
Proof-by-contradiction: Consider the contrary possibility that the inequality
Θ(P ) > B failed and that P is a Herbrand-proof of ⊥ from the axiom system
α where Θ(P ) ≤ B . ∗ ∗∗
Deﬁnition 6 had indicated every term T in the proof P satisﬁes
Θ(P ) > MinG(T.) Also, Lemma 4.2 implied Val(T ) <MinG(T ). These inequali-
ties and *** imply that every term T in the proof P satisﬁes
Val(T ) < B(28)
Equation (28) implies all the terms T1, T2, T3... in the Herbrandized instances in
the proof P satisfy Val(Ti) < B. The normalized form of an instance of a Skolem-
ized axiom is illustrated by Equation (29). The combination of our Val(Ti) < B
inequalities together with (27)’s B−Bounded constraint on α’s axioms implies that
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each such instance of (29) appearing in the proof P must be automatically valid
under the standard model of the natural numbers.
ψ˜ [ T1 , f
ψ
1 (T1) , T2 , f
ψ
2 (T1, T2) ... Tn , f
ψ
n (T1, T2...Tn) ](29)
The latter observation completes our proof-by-contradiction because it essen-
tially contradicts the initial statement ∗∗∗ that had started our contradiction proof.
More precisely ∗ ∗ ∗ had asserted that P was a Herbrand-proof of ⊥ from the
axiom system α. However, the Footnote 2 shows that such is impossible when the
last sentence of the preceding paragraph had indicated that each instance of (29)’s
Skolemized axiom is actually fully valid under the standard model of the natural
numbers. 
Finishing the Proof for Theorem 4.3. It is easy to combine the machineries of
Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 to complete the proof of Theorem 4.3. This is because Lemma
6.1 had indicated that every B−Bounded Valid ΠR1 sentence can be rewritten into
a logically equivalent form that has a B−Bounded Good Skolemization. Thus,
Theorem 4.3 follows by simply taking such rewritten forms of α’s axioms and then
applying Lemma 6.2’s machinery. 
2 The point here is simply that a conjunction of Skolemized instances can produce a proof of ⊥ only when
there exists no model M where all these instances are simultaneously valid. Hence when the preceding
paragraph shows that all these Skolemized instances are simultaneously valid under the Standard Model of
the Natural Numbers, it implies that certainly no such proof of ⊥ can feasibly exist !
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